A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey\u27s Mount Laurel Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York by Nolon, John R.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 1986 Article 2
September 1986
A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey's Mount
Laurel Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York
John R. Nolon
Pace University School of Law, jnolon@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
John R. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey's Mount Laurel Cases with the Berenson Cases in
New York, 4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 3 (1986)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/2
A Comparative Analysis of New
Jersey's Mount Laurel Cases with the
Berenson Cases in New York
John R. Nolon*
I. Introduction
Due to the widespread concern over the lack of affordable
housing in New York, renewed interest has been expressed in
the landmark case of Berenson v. Town of New Castle.' That
case and an associated line of decisions define the legal rules
that will be used by the courts in New York to decide whether
municipal zoning unconstitutionally excludes affordable types
of housing. Interest has been piqued further by two recent
lower court cases in New York which differ greatly in their
approach to defining the legal standards to be used in review-
ing allegedly exclusionary land use practices.
The rules adopted by the appellate courts in New York
differ in degree from those rules applied in New Jersey under
the Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel2 cases (commonly known as Mount Laurel I
* John R. Nolon, J.D., University of Michigan Law School; Member, American
Bar Association, Section on Urban, State and Local Government Law. He has served
as an advisor to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
President's Council on Development Choices for the 1980's.
Through his real estate counselling and law practice, he represents private and
public sector clients regarding real estate transactions, land use, and affordable hous-
ing. He has written housing policy statements adopted by localities, including
Princeton, New Jersey and Macon, Georgia. He is currently an Adjunct Professor at
Pace University School of Law and is a frequent contributor to professional publica-
tions, including the Urban Lawyer. He has also written several technical guidebooks
in the field.
1. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
2. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)(Mount Laurel I); Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390
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and Mount Laurel II), although the courts in both states have
based their decisions on remarkably similar constitutional
principles. At issue in these cases is whether local zoning ordi-
nances which exclude certain types of housing generally recog-
nized as being more affordable, are invalid because of their
tendency to exclude from the community a large segment of
those in need of housing in the region. The basic inquiry in
the cases is whether, and to what extent, the state constitu-
tion requires zoning jurisdictions to recognize and accomodate
regional housing needs, particularly of lower income people.
The consequence of the Mount Laurel decisions has been
rezoning by communities throughout New Jersey, which has
resulted in the construction of a large number of lower- and
middle-income housing units.' Throughout the state of New
Jersey, land has been rezoned to provide for higher density
residential development with the requirement that a percent-
age (usually twenty percent) of the resultant dwelling units be
sold or rented at prices affordable to lower income house-
holds." The bulk of the units (approximately eighty percent of
those produced) are generally affordable to middle income
households. Market forces have dictated this result. Thus, re-
zoning under Mount Laurel II results in the production of
housing for a wide spectrum of income groups many of which
otherwise could not afford housing produced in the New
Jersey market.
Under the Berenson cases in New York, rezoning has oc-
curred but it will not result in the production of affordable
housing for moderate income households. The direct effect of
the Berenson cases has been limited mainly to the defendant
municipality.' As a result of these rulings, New Castle has re-
(1983)(Mount Laurel ).
3. See D. Kinsey, Affordable Housing in Central New Jersey: The Consequences
of Mount Laurel II (April 30, 1986) [hereinafter Kinsey & Hand] (Report prepared
by Kinsey & Hand, Princeton. N.J., for Middlesex Somerset Mercer Regional Coun-
cil, Inc., Princeton, N.J.).
4. See Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 256-57, 456 A.2d at 441.
5. The contested parcel of land in the Town of New Castle is currently being
developed. On that site, one hundred seventy-seven condominiums will be built at
just over three units per acre. They will sell for from one hundred and eighty thou-
sand dollars to three hundred thousand dollars.
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vised its zoning to provide for a variety of housing types, gen-
erally considered to be more affordable than single-family
homes constructed on individual lots. Under this revised or-
dinance, approximately five hundred medium density town-
houses or condominiums have been constructed, some of
which have been marketed at relatively affordable prices
(under one hundred thousand dollars). Applications are pend-
ing for multi-family housing on land rezoned under Berenson.
There are also other sites zoned for multi-family housing that
may be developed in the future. The indirect effect of the
Berenson case on the provision of multi-family housing can-
not be measured accurately. In Westchester County (where
New Castle is located) and the surrounding counties, several
communities have rezoned land for multi-family housing in
response to threatened litigation under Berenson.7
The central question raised by these events is how two
sister state courts could evaluate similar facts and come to de-
cisions that have produced such remarkably different results.
This is particularly curious in view of the relatively similar
constitutional principles enunciated by the highest court in
both states in these cases. A description of the legal thought
process in New York, and a point by point comparison of the
holdings in each state will assist in understanding why afford-
able housing is being produced in New Jersey but not in New
York.
II. Summary of the Berenson Line of Cases
The first Berenson case was brought in the early 1970's
by Mitchell Berenson against the Town of New Castle in
Westchester County, New York. The plaintiff was a land de-
veloper aggrieved by the absence of any provision in the New
6. New Castle, N.Y., Local Law No. 16 (1979).
7. In the Town of North Hempstead, New York, a zoning provision requiring
local residency as a condition for eligibility to occupancy housing in a senior citizens
zoning district was held unconstitutional under Berenson. Allen v. Town of North
Hempstead, 103 A.D.2d 144, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1984). This case did not result in the
production of housing, but it did open existing housing in the town to elderly resi-
dents of surrounding communities.
1986]
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Castle ordinances that allowed the construction of multi-fam-
ily housing. His claim, briefly stated was as follows:
1. That the town derived its authority to zone from the
state constitution through specific authority delegated by the
State legislature.
2. That this authority had to be exercised in the interest
of all the people of the State.
3. That zoning which prohibits the construction of more
affordable types of housing, such as multi-family housing, by
definition excludes a large segment of the State's population.
4. That an effective method for the courts to use to rem-
edy this wrong would be to allow the plaintiff, as a builder, to
build multi-family housing.
The case was initially brought in the Supreme Court in West-
chester County. Both parties presented motions for summary
judgment which were denied. Both appealed the denial to the
appellate division, which affirmed the lower court decision.9
Appeal was then taken to the New York Court of Appeals, the
state's highest court, which took the opportunity to instruct
the lower court on how to proceed at the trial level in review-
ing the Berenson claim.
The first formal opinion was rendered by the New York
Court of Appeals on December 2, 1975.10 It established a two-
prong test to be applied when determining the reasonableness
of local zoning ordinances. The two factors are: (1) whether
the town has provided a properly balanced and well ordered
plan for the community-that is, are the present and future
housing needs of all the town's residents met;" and (2) were
regional needs considered." After adopting these guidelines,
the state's highest court remanded the case for trial to the
8. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, No. 04239/73 (Westchester County Sup. Ct.,
Nov. 9, 1973).
9. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 44 A.D.2d 839, 355 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1974);
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 44 A.D.2d 564, 353 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1974).
10. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
11. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
12. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
[Vol. 4
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Supreme Court in Westchester County. The Berenson'3 case
was decided by the supreme court, on December 6, 1977. After
a trial on the issues, Judge Trainor found that New Castle's
ordinance violated both prongs of the test. The zoning ordi-
nance was declared invalid to the extent that it failed to allow
for multi-family development at densities of at least eight
units to the acre. New Castle was directed to issue a building
permit for the project and given six months to amend its ordi-
nances to provide for the construction of three thousand five
hundred units of multi-family housing over a ten year period.
The decision was then appealed by New Castle. That case was
decided by the appellate division, on April 23, 1979.' " The
court upheld the Westchester County Supreme Court's decla-
ration of invalidity of the ordinance itself and the rezoning of
plaintiff's land.' 5 However, it reversed the lower court's judi-
cially prescribed "fair share" goal as well as its order that
New Castle award a specific density for the plaintiff's develop-
ment.' The court gave the Town of New Castle six months to
remedy the constitutional defects in its zoning ordinance.' 7
The Town of New Castle again found itself in 1983 de-
fending its zoning ordinance. This time, in Blitz v. Town of
New Castle,'8 the plaintiffs challenged the amended zoning
ordinance adopted by New Castle as required by the April
1979 Berenson decision. That amendment had been sustained
by the Westchester County Supreme Court after a trial on the
facts.' 9 The amended ordinance included new multi-family
zones, minimum densities with bonuses for certain project fea-
tures, floating zones with medium densities, and accessory
apartment provisions.2 0 The appellate division sustained the
lower court's findings regarding the ordinance's constitution-
13. Unpublished opinion, Westchester County Sup. Ct. (Dec. 30, 1977), discussed
in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 507, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (1979).
14. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979).
15. Id. at 523-24, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1983).
19. Unpublished opinion discussed in Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92,
94, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (1983).
20. See Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 94-95, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34.
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ality.21 The court relied upon the County Planning Commis-
sioner's approval of the ordinance," gave a presumption of va-
lidity to the county's adopted housing goal,23 and found that
the ordinance accommodated New Castle's expected propor-
tionate share of that legislatively defined housing need.'
In 1980, in Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper
Brookville,2" the Berenson issues returned to the New York
Court of Appeals for the first time since 1975. The Village of
Upper Brookville, in this case, appealed an appellate division
ruling that its five acre, minimum-lot size zoning was invalid
under Berenson.26 The court of appeals reversed the appellate
division and sustained the zoning, in the absence of any show-
ing at the trial that Upper Brookville had failed to consider
regional housing needs and that such needs were unsatisfied.
The court of appeals found that the evidence provided at trial
failed to prove that the ordinance was enacted with an "exclu-
sionary purpose," or that it ignored regional needs and had an
unjustifiable exclusionary effect.2 8 This additional factor,
whether an ordinance has an "exclusionary purpose," as set
forth by the court of appeals in Kurzius, is now considered to
be a third prong of the test by which New York courts will
evaluate municipal zoning ordinances. Applying these criteria
to the ordinance in question, the court held that the plaintiff
had not sustained the burden of rebutting the presumption of
constitutionality normally accorded such ordinances.2
In Allen v. Town of North Hempstead,3 0 decided in 1984,
21. Id. at 102, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
22. Id. at 96, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
23. Id. at 97-98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
24. Id. at 98-100, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.
25. 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1042 (1981).
26. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 67 A.D.2d 70, 414
N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979).
27. Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 346, 414 N.E.2d at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 103 A.D.2d 144, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1984). This case was decided by the Ap-
pellate Division of the Second Department which handed down the 1979 Berenson
decision.
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a durational residency requirement imposed as a pre-condi-
tion to qualifying for residence in a Golden Age Residence
District in North Hempstead was found to violate the Beren-
son and Kurzius tests, and thus to be unconstitutional. The
court determined that such a requirement was enacted with
an exclusionary purpose and failed to consider regional hous-
ing needs. The court wrote that "[tihe durational residence
requirement at bar has a more direct exclusionary effect on
nonresidents like plaintiffs than the almost total exclusion of
multi-family housing held to be unconstitutional by this court
[in Berenson]." 31 Here, ample proof regarding the needs of
senior citizens in surrounding communities was placed on the
record.
In the case of Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of
Brookhaven,32 currently pending before the New York Court
of Appeals,33 low-income plaintiffs have argued that the Town
of Brookhaven's failure to zone to provide for low- and moder-
ate-income housing, not simply multi-family housing, is in vi-
olation of the Berenson standards. At issue in Suffolk Hous-
ing Services, is whether it is sufficient for a municipality to
zone allowing for an array of housing types (which the Village
of Brookhaven did), or whether there is a constitutional obli-
gation to go further and facilitate the development of housing
specifically affordable to lower income households. The appel-
late division held that the New York Court of Appeals, in its
1975 Berenson decision did not intend to impose any such af-
firmative duty.3 4 Recall that the court of appeals Berenson
test includes an examination of whether the municipality con-
sidered the needs of the region as well as the town for multi-
ple housing.3 5 The appellate division stated that the New
York Court of Appeals' earlier Berenson decision "[m]erely
31. Id. at 149, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
32. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985).
33. This case, which was lost by the plaintiffs at the trial court and Appellate
Department levels, is the first Berenson style case to be brought in New York by low-
income plaintiffs who are requesting zoning practices that will make housing for them
affordable.
34. Suffolk Hous. Servs., 109 A.D.2d at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
35. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
1986]
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requires that a town allow for the construction of different
types of housing in sufficient numbers for those people who
want and can afford it."38 To accept the plaintiff's contention
that the court intended an affirmative mandate to facilitate
the construction of housing affordable to lower income house-
holds, "would require us [the court] to work a change of his-
toric proportions in the development of New York zoning law,
a step which we respectfully decline to take. '3 7 The New York
Court of Appeals has agreed to review the unanimous decision
of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Suffolk
Housing Services.
A very different decision was rendered in Asian American
for Equality v. Koch3 by the Supreme Court of the First Ju-
dicial Department, shortly after the determination by the ap-
pellate division of Suffolk Housing Services. As compared to
the previous New York exclusionary zoning cases, the Asian
American case arose out of a novel set of circumstances. In
this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the various density bonus
provisions of New York City's zoning ordinance, as applied to
the heavily settled Chinatown area, displaced lower income
residents and, therefore violated the principles articulated in
Berenson. This court in considering its options, referred di-
rectly to the Suffolk Housing Services appellate division deci-
sion and stated:
While New York courts have previously been hesitant to
adopt the Mount Laurel doctrine because it places a
heavier burden on municipalities, upon consideration of
the important constitutional considerations at stake, it is
my opinion that it is now appropriate to adopt the Mount
Laurel doctrine as the law of New York.3 9
After the court asserted its adoption of the Mount Laurel
doctrine,4 0 it held that "[in light of the needs of the China-
36. Suffolk Hous. Servs., 109 A.D.2d at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
37. Id. at 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
38. 129 Misc.2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1985).
39. Id. at 82, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
40. "[Tihe zoning power is no more abused by keeping out the region's poor than
[Vol. 4
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town community, a well-balanced plan may be held to consist
of a plan which facilitates the construction of quality low-in-
come housing.""'
As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, it is easily ascer-
tained that New York law regarding exclusionary zoning is in
flux. The factors which the New York Court of Appeals estab-
lished are broad, allowing the lower courts great discretion in
fashioning their decisions. This has resulted in inconsistent
decisions within New York, continued litigation on the issue,
and has forced some courts to seek other viable alternatives,
such as in the Asian American case, in the hope of making a
fair and just determination.
III. The Constitutional Underpinnings
A. Berenson v. Town of New Castle
The standards for judging whether zoning ordinances in
New York are unconstitutionally exclusionary were first ar-
ticulated by the state's highest court in 1975. In the first Ber-
enson decision, the New York Court of Appeals clarified cer-
tain fundamental principles regarding the delegation and use
of the power to zone. First, the court stated that "the primary
goal of a zoning ordinance must be to provide for the develop-
ment of a balanced, cohesive community which will make effi-
cient use of the town's available land."' 2 Second, "in enacting
a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional
needs and requirements.... There must be a balancing of the
local desire to maintain the status quo within the community
and the greater public interest that regional [housing] needs
be met."' '3 Third, that "[a]lthough we are aware of the tradi-
tional view that zoning acts only upon the property lying
within the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recog-
by forcing out the resident poor." Id. at 81, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (quoting Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 214, 456 A.2d
390, 418 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
41. Id. at 88, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
42. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975).
43. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (emphasis in original).
19861
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nized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the
boundaries of the municipality."'
B. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel
In 1975, the same year that the Berenson standards were
created, New Jersey's highest court handed down the most
far-reaching exclusionary zoning case in state law history.""
This case was reinterpreted and rendered much more specific
in a 1983 decision by the same court.46 The two Mount Laurel
cases are based on language similar to that used by the Beren-
son court. In articulating the standards for judging whether
zonging ordinances are unconstitutionally exclusionary, the
Mount Laurel cases set forth three principles. First, that
"[wihen the exercise of ... [police] power by a municipality
affects something as fundamental as housing, the general wel-
fare includes more than the welfare of that municipality and
its citizens .... Municipal land use regulations that conflict
with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power
and are unconstitutional.""' Second, that
it is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning
power is a police power of the state and the local author-
ity is acting only as a delegate of that power and is re-
stricted in the same manner as is the state. So, when reg-
ulation does have a substantial external impact, the
welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must
be recognized and served.48
And third, that "each such municipality [must] . .. plan and
provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportu-
nity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, includ-
44. Id.
45. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)(Mount Laurel I).
46. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
47. Id. at 208, 456 A.2d at 415.
48. Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
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ing, of course, low and moderate cost housing to meet the
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who
may desire to live within its boundaries." '49 Thus, the courts in
both these states based their decisions on similar constitu-
tional principles. Since the constitutional principles employed
are similar, it follows that the dramatically different results
stem from a markedly different application of these principles
in the two states.
IV. Defining Municipal Responsibility
Both the Berenson and the Mount Laurel cases trace the
exercise of local zoning power back to the grant of police
power by the people to the state government through the
adoption of the state constitution. The zoning power dele-
gated to local governments by the state legislature must, by
definition, be exercised with the needs of the people of the
state as a whole in mind. Both courts have used similar logic
to define this obligation. The two courts, however, have cho-
sen different methods of implementing their holdings with re-
spect to exclusionary zoning.
A. What is the Nature of the Obligation Under these Cases?
In New Jersey "a developing municipality.., must, by its
land use regulations, make realistically possible the opportu-
nity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all
categories of people who may desire to live there" which in-
cludes the low- and moderate-income residents." The munici-
pality must permit multi-familty housing "as well as small
dwellings on very small lots, low cost housing of other types
and, in general, high density zoning, without artificial and un-
justifiable minimum requirements . . . to meet the full pano-
ply of these needs. 51
In New York "in determining the validity of an ordinance
excluding multi-family housing as a permitted use, we must
49. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728.
50. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
51. Id.
1986]
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consider the general purposes which the concept of zoning
seeks to serve."52 In excluding new multiple housing, it must
be determined whether the town "considered the needs of the
region as well as the town for such housing."5 Thus, New
Jersey looks to the categories of people who desire to live in
that municipality while in New York one must look beyond
the municipality and consider the general needs of the region.
B. Do All Communities Have These Obligations?
In both New York and New Jersey, it is principally "de-
veloping communities" that must comply with the obligations
imposed by these anti-exclusionary zoning cases. For New
Jersey, "the general welfare which developing municipalites
like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their bound-
aries and cannot be parochially confined. . . ."" In New York,
the Berenson line of cases has similarly confined itself to de-
veloping communities.5 The logic behind this limitation is
straightforward. "The effective development of a region
should not and cannot be made to depend upon the adventi-
tious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed de-
cades or even centuries ago. . .. "51
In New Jersey, the court relied on the New Jersey State
Development Guide Plan 57 (SDGP) as the method for deter-
52. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975).
53. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S. at 681.
54. Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
55. "In view of the fact that the Town of Pompey, unlike New Castle, is conced-
edly not a developing community ... we agree that the Berenson test need not be
applied in the instant case." Town of Pompey v. Parker, 53 A.D.2d 125, 127, 385
N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (1976), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 805, 377 N.E.2d 741, 406 N.Y.S.2d 287
(1978).
56. Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d 347,
350 (1949) (cited in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 177, 336 A.2d 713, 726-727 (1975)(Mount Laurel I)).
57. New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning, State Development
Guide Plan (May 1980). The state legislature had authorized the creation of the State
Development Guide Plan (SDGP) "for the future improvement and development of
the State." 1961 N.J. Laws c. 47 § 15(a)(2). In 1985 the New Jersey legislature
amended that act, requiring a new plan be developed, a "State Development and
Redevelopment Guide Plan." 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. c. 398, § 1 (codified at N.J.
[Vol. 4
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mining which municipalities have an obligation to meet the
Mount Laurel mandate. The SDGP has been used to guide
state investment policies, capital growth strategies, program
policies, and to determine, in general, where growth should be
encouraged and discouraged. In the court's view, the SDGP
clearly sets forth "the state's policy as to where growth should
be encouraged and discouraged, . . . [and] effectively serve[s]
as a blueprint for the implementation of the Mount Laurel
doctrine." 58 In New York, no uniform method has been
adopted to determine which municipalities are developing in
order to meet the Berenson obligation. As in Town of Pompey
v. Parker,5 9 these decisions are being made on a case by case
basis, in the absense of a regional or statewide standards such
as those relied upon in New Jersey.
In many developing communities the argument is made
that lower income, higher density housing has negative envi-
ronmental impacts. A town may purport that it's potential for
growth is "limited because of its environmental setting and
rural characteristics."6 Other arguments include the assertion
that "[tihere are no sewers and no water lines, many of the
roads are unpaved. . . ."' However, in most instances, the
possible negative environmental impact of a specific develop-
ment can be provided for and mitigated by proper municipal
and site planning.
The real issue is what type of growth a municipality will
permit. With sophisticated new zoning and development tech-
niques such as cluster and planned-unit development, on-site
systems and buffering techniques, housing affordability and
environmental conservation can be harmonious objectives.
The impetus of Mount Laurel and Berenson is one additional
force that invites more careful and considered planning at the
Stat. Ann. § 52:18A-196 (West 1985)). This document will replace the SDGP.
58. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 236, 456
A.2d 390, 440 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
59. 53 A.D.2d 125, 385 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 805, 377 N.E.2d 741,
406 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978).
60. Brown, County Effort on Zoning Meets Resistance, N.Y. Times, March 22,
1987, § 8 (Real Estate), at 13, col. 1 (Westchester ed.).
61. Id.
19861
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local level. In many circumstances, large-lot single-family
housing, the preferred zoning in many communities, is ineffec-
tive in preserving environmental quality. Higher density, clus-
tered developments, the type preferred by developers, allows
for the preservation of valuable open space, for the prevention
of environmental contamination, the elimination of septic
fields, and the limitation of traffic hazards. Leftover notions of
the negative impact of density development that come from
the traditional grid-pattern zoning no longer militate against
high density development.2
C. How are Regional Housing Needs Defined?
The 1975 Mount Laurel I decision defined a developing
municipality's obligation to afford the opportunity for decent
and adequate low- and moderate-income housing to extend at
least to "that municipality's fair share of the present and pro-
spective regional need therefor." 3 Subsequent to that deci-
sion, there was considerable confusion as to how the region's
needs, and the municipality's share of those needs were to be
defined, because under Mount Laurel I the New Jersey court
had not assigned a numerical fair share to each developing
community. The two hundred page Mount Laurel II decision
was a reaction by the court to the lack of progress under the
relatively general standards adopted by the court under
Mount Laurel I. The Mount Laurel II court addressed these
issues frontally. First, it decided that each municipality must
be assigned a numerical fair share of its region's need."' Sec-
ond, it defined the need strictly in terms of low- and moder-
ate-income housing, and further defined low and moderate by
adopting the standards used for federal housing subsidy pro-
grams.6 5 Third, it defined "region" as "'that general area
62. See Stever, A Brief Essay on Inclusionary Zoning and Environmental Zon-
ing, 4 Pace Envt'l L. Rev. 157 (1986).
63. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 724, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)(Mount Laurel).
64. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 220-23, 456 A.2d 390, 421-22 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
65. Id. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8.
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which constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of
which the subject municipality is a part, and from which the
prospective population of the municipality would substan-
tially be drawn, in the absence of exclusionary zoning.' "66
Fourth, it established broad guidelines for defining a fair
share methodology by indicating that a formula that was
based on projected employment and ratables would be
favored.6
The Mount Laurel II court understood that even these
specific guidelines would need greater definition. The task of
making these standards more specific was divided into three
steps: first, determination of a region; second, an assessment
of the housing need in the region; and third, an allocation of
that need. The court provided for the completion of these
steps by assigning three judges to hear all Mount Laurel I
cases throughout the state."8 It was the court's intent that this
would result in the relatively early and "fairly consistent de-
termination" of regions and regional needs. 9
It is important to emphasize that the venture of the New
Jersey judiciary into this relatively uncharted area was the re-
sult of the court's great frustration with the lack of local com-
pliance with the Mount Laurel I decision.
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial
order invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel re-
mains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance.
Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts,
the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount
Laurel's determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel
is not alone; we believe that there is widespread non-com-
pliance with the constitutional mandate of our original
opinion in this case.7 1
66. Id. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 537, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219).
67. Id. at 248-58, 456 A.2d at 436-41.
68. Id. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 198, 456 A.2d at 410.
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In New York, the Berenson courts have rejected any no-
tion of assigning a numerical fair share to an exclusionary mu-
nicipality. "[T]he Court of Appeals [in 1975] impliedly held
that New Castle per se did not have to bear any 'fair share' of
any such housing burden." Instead, the Berenson doctrine
is, that the courts are to "assess the reasonableness of what
the locality has done, '"72 in light of present and foreseeable
local and regional housing needs. Then in the 1983 Blitz deci-
sion, the appellate division articulated yet another standard
called the "expected proportionate share" doctrine. 73 Here the
judicial inquiry should be "whether [a town's] provisions for
housing are at all commensurate with some general notion of
its expected contribution to the regional housing need. '74 By
reviewing the evidence submitted in the second Berenson case
and the Blitz case, it can be implied that the housing region,
at least in Westchester County, is the entire county as af-
fected by the overall housing demand in the metropolitan
area. This general definition of the region has not undergone
further refinement in New York.
Emerging from the Berenson line of cases, is an under-
standing of the extreme importance placed on an evidentiary
development of the actual, provable housing need in the ap-
plicable region. The New York courts assess the reasonable-
ness of what a municipality has done with its zoning ordi-
nance. In so doing, they give a presumption of validity to the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, and then require
those challenging the ordinance to bear the burden of proving
its lack of reasonableness. This burden can be overcome by
proving that the locality's share of unmet regional and local
housing needs is not accommodated by its present zoning
ordinance.
The holding of the 1979 Berenson case, which was written
four years before the Mount Laurel H decision, relied heavily
71. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 679
(1983).
72. Berenson v, Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975).
73. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1983).
74. Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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on the fact that no court had ever required that concrete
figures be specially found or imposed by judicial fiat. "The
[Oakwood at Madison] court held that numerical housing
quotas ... were not realistically translatable into specific sub-
stantive zoning amendments.... ,7 Ironically, it was the lack
of action in New Jersey under the general guidelines then in-
corporated into its earlier decisions, that led the Mount Lau-
rel II court in 1983 to assign specific numerical fair share re-
sponsibility to offending municipalities.
D. What Relevance is Given To Legislative Definitions of
Housing Needs?
In both New York and New Jersey, the courts have de-
ferred to legislative and governmental policies with respect to
zoning. In the original Berenson case, for example, the New
York Court of Appeals wrote that:
Zoning ... is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite
anomalous that a court should be required to perform the
tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we look to the
Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to fos-
ter the development of programs designed to achieve
sound regional planning.... Until the day comes when
regional, rather than local, governmental units can make
such determinations, the courts must assess the reasona-
bleness of what the locality has done."6
This attitude of deference, as articulated in Berenson, has
continued in cases concerning exclusionary zoning in New
York.77 In New Jersey, the Mount Laurel II court adopted the
75. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 517, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (quoting Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 499, 371 A.2d 1192, 1200 (1977)).
76. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
77. In the Blitz case, legislative definitions of regional housing needs were given
greater weight.
The town urges that the county housing policy, with its stated goal of 50,000
new housing units ... should carry with it the same presumption of validity
as any other legislative act; .... We agree with the town that the 50,000-unit
goal is presumptively valid and the evidence at trial clearly established the
rationality and soundness of that legislative finding.
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State Development Guide Plan (SDGP) as a means of deter-
mining which communities have an obligation to meet a fair
share of regional needs. By so doing, the court implied that it
would have relied on a specific housing need determination
that appeared in the SDGP or a similar document prepared
by an agency of the state.
E. Is the Municipality's Obligation Limited to Meeting the
Housing Needs of Lower Income People?
In both New Jersey and New York, the constitutional de-
fect in challenged zoning ordinances has been their tendency
to exclude people of limited income. The Mount Laurel II
court required both a determination of the housing needs of
lower income persons and that the municipality's fair share of
those needs be met. Lower income was generally defined as
income which renders a family eligible for federally subsidized
housing programs. 8 This definition of responsibility was a re-
jection by the Mount Laurel II court of its earlier decision to
allow municipalities to satisfy their obligations by amending
their zoning regulations to render feasible the "least-cost"
housing which private industry will undertake. Under Mount
Laurel II, least-cost housing will only be allowed to satisfy a
community's fair share after a showing that no combination of
the ordinance's provisions and "other" actions, prove success-
ful in providing housing that could be afforded by lower in-
come people. 11
Due to the fact that lower income housing has not re-
sulted from the Berenson rulings in New York, it is largely
thought that the Berenson cases are not founded on the provi-
sion of lower income housing. However, the 1979 Berenson de-
cision reversed the trial court's determination that New Castle
must rezone to accommodate three thousand five hundred
housing units because its determination was not limited to
lower income housing needs. The court stated:
Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 97, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
78. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 221 n.8, 456 A.2d 390, 421 n.8 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
79. Id. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451-52.
[Vol. 4
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/2
COMPARATIVE ANAL YSIS
In point of fact then, the multi-family housing quota
of three thousand and five hundred units, adopted by
Special Term as New Castle's 'fair share' of regional
housing needs is a highly abstract and speculative num-
ber .... [Tihe court apparently failed to appreciate that
the figure itself was referable to the housing market in
general, both as to income groups and the type of housing
... and was not directly referable to the needs of the low
income groups with which the [1975 Berenson] court was
primarily concerned. The use of a 'fair share' goal has
never been judicially approved in the context of the hous-
ing needs of the population at large. Its raison d'etre lies
in the housing needs of the low and moderate income
groups. . . .Moreover, Special Term's judgment cannot
and does not insure that any of the multi-family units to
be constructed will be anything other than luxury condo-
miniums, with which the market may already be
saturated."
Thus, the courts in both states have limited their decisions by
making it clear that municipalities have an obligation to meet
the housing needs of low-income people, though the courts
postulated different methods for the municipalities to use in
carrying out the court's decisions.
F. How Are Municipalities to Provide for Housing
Affordable to Lower Income People?
New York, under the 1979 Berenson decision, incorpo-
rated the earlier New Jersey "least-cost" housing concept.
Least-cost housing has been defined as housing that can be
constructed after the removal of "all excessive restrictions and
exactions and after a thorough use by a municipality of all
affirmative devices that might lower costs." ' In Berenson,
when the court adopted the least-cost method, it stated that:
[W]hile not sufficient to save the zoning ordinance from
80. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 520-21, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669,
678 (1979)(emphasis in original).
81. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
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invalidation, the town's contention that multi-family
rental housing (the type most affordable by persons of
low and moderate income) cannot be constructed today
even with governmental subsidies unless the land is pub-
licly owned or figured at zero cost is not without some
merit, especially if we are talking about providing lower
income housing in sizeable quantities. Indeed, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's subsequent focus upon 'least-
cost' housing as opposed to low-income housing is attrib-
utable to its recognition that it will be virtually impossi-
ble to provide large amounts of newly constructed hous-
ing for the economially less fortunate in the foreseeable
future.s2
Thus, New York found the Madison"3 rationale concerning
least cost more appropriate in application than other theories
postulated for providing low-income housing.
As noted, the Mount Laurel II court greatly modified its
allowance for "least-cost" solutions by limiting its use to situ-
ations where no combination of actions proves capable of pro-
viding housing actually affordable to lower income persons. 84
In part, this change is based on the rejection of the notion
that middle-income, or least-cost housing would eventually fil-
ter down to the poor. The principal technique now relied on
in New Jersey is rezoning that provides density bonuses in ex-
change for the provision of lower income housing. The amount
of lower income housing to be provided is suggested by the
court to be twenty percent of the total to be constructed. 5 A
developer is to be awarded additional density, which in turn,
allows him to build and market more housing units than per-
mitted by the underlying zoning. This technique allows for
the production of lower income housing because a portion of
the value added by the density bonus is used to reduce the
price of the lower income units. Additionally, the units can be
82. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678. See Oakwood at Madison v.
Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 510-14, 371 A.2d 1192, 1206-08 (1977).
83. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 517, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (quoting Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 499, 371 A.2d 1192, 1200 (1977)).
84. See supra p. 18.
85. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279 n.37, 456 A.2d at 452 n.37.
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priced so that the market rate houses bear all the land costs
and a high proportion of the infrastructure costs. The experi-
ence under Mount Laurel II suggests that sufficient value can
be added and other costs reduced by this technique to reduce
the cost of the lower income units so they are affordable to
lower income households. The recent results in New Jersey
under Mount Laurel II using this density bonus technique
counter the New York court's assertion that "it will be virtu-
ally impossible to provide large amounts of newly constructed
housing for the economically less fortunate . ".8.."6
G. What Specific Actions Must Municipalities Take Under
These Inclusionary Zoning Cases?
Mount Laurel II required that developing New Jersey
communities employ a number of affirmative steps to provide
lower income housing. First, they must rezone sufficient land
at higher densities. Although the court understood that higher
densities are often a prerequisite for affordability, it also un-
derstood that higher density zoning, alone, seldom produces
affordable lower income housing.87 Second, zoning ordinances
must be amended to remove cost generating restrictions and
exactions, and to include density bonuses, mandatory lower
income set-aside requirements,88 or mobile home construc-
tion.89 To maintain the affordability of these units on re-
rental or resale, the court sanctioned the use of rent controls
and resale price controls.9 0 Third, the court indicated that
86. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
The use of density bonuses in New Jersey since the Mount Laurel II decision in
1983 has produced remarkable results. According to a recent study carried out in a
three-county area in central New Jersey, a total of 1,754 units of low- and moderate-
income housing units were occupied, being built, approved or pending approval. See
Kinsey & Hand, supra note 3. The study showed that lower-income units were being
provided in eleven of the seventeen townships in the three-county area. In the three
years since Mount Laurel II, more lower-income housing was being provided than in
fifty years of federal housing subsidy programs, which had in this area been responsi-
ble for only 1,334 units of affordable housing. Id.
87. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 261, 456 A.2d at 443.
88. Id. at 267-74, 456 A.2d at 446-50.
89. Id. at 274-77, 456 A.2d at 450-51.
90. Id. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447.
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"[w]here appropriate, municipalities should provide a realistic
opportunity for housing through other municipal action inex-
tricably related to land regulations." 91 Such actions could in-
clude granting a tax abatement where it is a prerequisite for a
housing subsidy, passing resolutions required for a project to
qualify for tax-exempt financing, or participating in the fed-
eral community development block grant program. The court
did not go on to require municipal funding of supportive in-
frastructure, an issue that is still open under Mount Laurel H.
Thus, the New Jersey court has decided to require municipali-
ties to act aggressively and affirmatively to insure that lower
income units are actually constructed.2 By contrast, the New
York rule is more passive:
[Z]oning ordinances will go no further than determining
what may or may not be built; ... in the absence of gov-
ernment subsidies. Thus, in terms of low-to-moderate in-
come rental housing-generally conceded to the most
pressing need ... even the most liberal zoning ordinance,
in the absence of affirmative governmental action to shift
the balance of market forces, will have no success in pro-
moting such housing construction."
There is, however, some recognition in the Berenson line
of cases that what is achievable in New Jersey will work in
New York. The 1979 Berenson court held the door open for
more aggressive judicial action if New Castle continued to act
in bad faith. It indicated that New York courts may give ex-
plicit, qualitative instructions to guide the municipality in its
rezoning.94 The Berenson court cited the New Jersey Oak-
91. Id. at 264, 456 A.2d at 444.
92. The potential envisioned by the Mount Laurel H mandate is currently being
realized as the number of actual low- and moderate-income units constructed in New
Jersey dramatically increases.
93. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1983).
The case was decided by the appellate division just six months after the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted a wholly different view of the extent to which zoning ordi-
nance revisions can go in creating lower income housing.
94. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 518, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669,
676 (1979).
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wood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison95 case as illus-
trative of what courts in New York might do. In Madison, the
court directed the township to allocate substantial land areas
for small-lot single-family houses, and to substantially enlarge
the areas for small-lot single-family houses.9 In addition, the
township was ordered to substantially enlarge the multi-fam-
ily apartment district, to modify building restrictions in vari-
ous districts, and to eliminate undue cost-generating restric-
tions. There appears to be no reason in such a case why a
court in New York could not go on to specify density bonuses,
set-asides, and mobile homes, if it were shown that such tech-
niques were needed to accomplish the purpose of providing
housing affordable to lower income households.
H. What Remedies Will the Court Use for Invalid Zoning?
Mount Laurel II employed three remedies. First, the de-
veloper who brings a successful exclusionary zoning suit will
ordinarily be authorized to construct his project. This is called
the "builder's remedy."9 Second, the court may employ a
95. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
96. Id. at 553, 371 A.2d at 1228.
97. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 279-81, 456 A.2d 390, 452-53 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
In 1985 the New Jersey legislature passed a Fair Housing Act, which imposed a
legisaltive moratorium on the "builder's remedy." 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 222 §
28 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-328 (West 1986)). The moratorium applied to
exclusionary zoning litigation which had been filed after January 20, 1983, unless a
final judgment providing for a builder's remedy had already beeen rendered for the
developer. Id. This moratorium terminates upon municipalities adopting resolutions
to submit a fair share housing plan to the agency created by the act (the Council on
Affordable Housing); submitting a "housing element" to that agency; and submitting
any fair share housing ordinances which have been enacted. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-
309 (West 1986). The minimum statutory period given for the municipalities to sub-
mit such documentation was nine months. At the end of that period the moratorium
would be terminated. This provision in the Act was then attacked as being unconsti-
tutional, the plaintiffs arguing that the provision usurped the judiciary's exclusive
powers to provide relief. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the section was
constitutional: total preclusion of the builders remedy had not occurred; "and most
importantly, we have never elevated the judicially created builder's remedy, in partic-
ular, to the level of a constitutionally protected right." The Hills Dev. Co. v. Town-
ship of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 46, 510 A.2d 621, 645 (1986). That case is commonly
known as Mount Laurel III.
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master (an expert), after a trial in which a zoning ordinance
has been invalidated.9 8 The master's role is to work with the
offending municipality and the plaintiff to negotiate the re-
quirements of a new zoning ordinance. Third, where a munici-
pality fails to adopt a satisfactory ordinance on its own, the
court can issue orders requiring adoption of specific ordi-
nances, imposing moratoria on other development, invalidat-
ing other ordinances or regulations, or requiring approval of
particular applications to construct housing, including lower
income units.
The Berenson line of cases has also identified a number
of remedies. As in Mount Laurel, Berenson adopted the
builder's remedy which awards the plaintiff developer a rezon-
ing for higher density, multi-family development.9 Another
remedy is that the zoning ordinance may be declared uncon-
stitutionally exclusionary, and that the municipality may be
instructed to rezone to cure the constitutional defect and to
accomodate its share of the regional housing need. 100 Finally,
courts may retain jurisdiction of such cases to order more
comprehensive relief if the local legislative body fails to act in
good faith. 10 1
V. The Major Unresolved Issues in New York
There are several issues to be resolved by the New York
courts in the coming year. The appeals of Suffolk Housing
Services and Asian American provide the court with a unique
opportunity to explain its earlier reasoning in the Berenson
and Kurzius decisions. The Asian American decision is par-
ticularly important because that court has specifically em-
braced the Mount Laurel obligation. The issues presented in
the lower court decisions involve a web of considerations,
98. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 281-85, 456 A.2d at 453-55.
99. Unpublished opinion, Westchester County Sup. Ct. (Dec. 30, 1977), dicussed
in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d, 506, 507, 415 N.Y.S. 669, 670 (1979).
100. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 523-24, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669,
680 (1979). See also Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 96-98, 463 N.Y.S.2d
832, 834-36 (1983).
101. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 523-24 n.2, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 680 n.2.,
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which are best addressed as a whole.
The first issue is the basic view of judicial responsibility
in reviewing land use matters. What standards should the ju-
diciary use in determining whether local ordinances are con-
stitutional? If local zoning is found to be unconstitutional,
how far should the courts go in supervising the process of con-
forming that zoning with constitutional standards?
The second issue is a practical corollary of the first. As-
suming a judicial inclination to prescribe local action, what
can be done to actually create affordable housing? Is there ev-
idence that suggests that affirmative land use action can result
in truly affordable housing? To the extent that it is perceived
by the judiciary that local zoning amendments cannot result
in affordable housing, it may be reluctant to place a heavy
burden on local governments in that regard.
The third issue has to do with who is to be protected by
the judiciary in these cases and how that protection is to be
insured. Is the legal obligation primarily focused on providing
housing for lower-income people? What mechanisms exist to
provide effective remedies for such people? If private develop-
ers, who are the plaintiffs in most exclusionary zoning cases,
are to be rewarded with zoning changes, how can the court
insure that such changes principally benefit lower income
people?
The fourth issue is whether the court perceives as practi-
cal the task of proving local and regional housing needs, and
of defining the extent of each municipality's obligation to
meet those needs. Can these matters competently be proved?
Can the court supervise the process of defining the local share
of established lower-income needs?
Finally, the courts must address the limitations on any
burden it may choose to impose on localities. Does the bur-
den, if any is found to exist, apply equally to all communities
of whatever size, no matter where located? If not, what stan-
dards are to be used to distinguish among them? Are there
any economic or environmental standards that should be ap-
plied to increase the burden in some instances and decrease it
in others?
In resolving these issues on appeal, the court would be
19861
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helped by taking a comprehensive view of them all. How far
the judiciary will go will likely be influenced by whether the
court perceives that the class of persons protected by the con-
stitutional principles at issue in these cases can truly be
benefitted by judicial action. Similarly, its view will be influ-
enced by whether it believes that manageable methods exist
for defining and allocating need, and pinpointing the responsi-
bility of differently situated municipalities.
VI. Conclusion
There are five key observations made in the foregoing
analysis. First, both the Mount Laurel and Berenson cases are
based on similar interpretations of their state constitutions.
Both hold that the local zoning power of developing communi-
ties must be exercised with the housing needs of the broader
region in mind. Both evidence a specific concern for the hous-
ing needs of low- and moderate-income households, because of
their "'circumstances of ... economic helplessness.' """0 Both
hold that the exclusionarily zoned municipalities must accom-
modate these needs by rezoning which provides for more af-
fordable types of housing.
Second, the specific mandates issued by the two courts
are also similar. Mount Laurel requires developing municipal-
ities to plan and provide by their land use regulations, a rea-
sonable opportunity for an appropriate variety of choice of
housing including low- and moderate-cost housing. Berenson
provides that a community must show that it has reasonably
provided, through its zoning, for the present and the future
needs of its residents, and its expected proportionate share of
the unmet regional needs.
Third, New Jersey has gone further than New York in
articulating the ways in which land use regulations should be
exercised to provide greater housing opportunity. For exam-
ple, frequent references are made in the Mount Laurel cases
to eliminating "cost generating restrictions and exactions, ' 103
102. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (quoting Pascack Ass'n. v.
Mayor & Council of Washington Township, 74 N.J. 470, 480, 379 A.2d 6, 11 (1977)).
103. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
[Vol. 4
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/2
COMPARATIVE ANAL YSIS
and to using "set-asides," and small-lot zoning.10 4 Addition-
ally, the Mount Laurel II case exhibited an unprecedented
faith in the ability of municipalities, through the exercise ot
their land use regulations alone, to create low- and moderate-
cost housing.
The Berenson doctrine is simply less developed in this re-
gard. To date, the plaintiffs in Berenson cases, with the ex-
ception of Brookhaven, have been developers who have sought
authority to build multi-family housing at moderate densities
to provide middle to upper income housing. The Berenson
cases refer primarily to the exclusion of "multi-family hous-
ing" as the offending characteristic of challenged ordinances.
At the time that the last appellate division Berenson case was
decided, the "least-cost" doctrine was being followed in New
Jersey, and the belief among the New Jersey and New York
courts was that the amendment of land use regulation alone
was unlikely to produce a significant amount of lower income
housing. Berenson referenced the New Jersey experience in
1979 and concluded: "it will be virtually impossible to provide
large amounts of newly constructed housing for the economi-
cally less fortunate in the foreseeable future."'0 5 Four years
later, the least-cost doctrine was all but repudiated in New
Jersey and the remarkable record of lower income housing
production that has resulted from that change in judicial atti-
tude must be recognized, if not followed, in New York.
Fourth, New Jersey has also been more aggressive than
its sister state in defining and allocating responsibility for re-
gional housing need. Through the use of special judges and a
broad range of experts, regions are being defined, needs deter-
mined, and specific allocations of need are being assigned to
developing communities. The Mount Laurel II court took
these steps because of its impatience with the lack of specific
progress in complying with its more general 1975 guidelines.
No such system for need determination and allocation exists
in New York. In fact, the New York courts have rejected the
158, 258-59, 456 A.2d 390, 441 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
104. Id. at 267-74, 456 A.2d at 446-50.
105. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
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notion of judically allocating fair share goals to specific com-
munities. It was noted, in the 1979 Berenson decision, that no
court had ever made a numerical fair share allocation. Here,
also, there has been a change in New Jersey. Specific numeri-
cal fair shares have been judically mandated and in a rela-
tively short period, zoning to accommodate a large number of
lower and middle income units has resulted.
Fifth, although the New York courts may remain firm in
their decision regarding the allocation of housing need to indi-
vidual communities, they have already put in place judicial
guidelines for ordering rezoning based on a specific showing of
regional needs and of a community's failure to meet its ex-
pected proportionate share of those needs. The New York ap-
proach is to proceed case by case and to require of its plain-
tiffs explict proof of regional needs and of local responsibility.
Where such proof is not offered, no relief can be expected.
The burden of proving the unreasonableness of a zoning ordi-
nance can be met by a showing that unfulfilled regional needs
have not been considered or accommodated by that ordi-
nance. Besides the regional need approach, the 1979 Berenson
court opened the door to the consideration of a "fair share"
allocation of lower income housing. The court rejected in that
case the evidence presented because it referenced housing
need generally, and was not limited to the lower income
needs. By linking "fair share" with lower income needs only,
the New York Court of Appeals may find this theory of alloca-
tion more palitable.
Finally, both courts are reluctantly involved in needs de-
termination and other planning issues because of the lack of
assistance with these matters by other branches of govern-
ment. The New Jersey court effectively used the legislatively
sanctioned, and administratively issued, State Development
Guide Plan as the overall structure for implementing its man-
dates. Under Berenson, regional and state legislators and
planners have been called on to define needs and responsibili-
ties. A county planner's testimony has been relied on to deter-
mine local compliance with regional needs, and a county hous-
ing goal has been given a presumption of legislative validity.
In the absence of effective guidance by county, regional
[Vol. 4
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and state officials, these important land use decisions will con-
tinue to be decided by the vagaries of litigation. Particularly
in New York, the future use and effect of Berenson will be
determined primarily by those who decide to initiate litigation
under this line of cases, and the purposes for which such suits
are brought.
VII. Postscript
A. Introduction
On June 11, 1987, the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the appellate division in Suffolk Hous-
ing Services v. Town Of Brookhaven,06 dismissing the com-
plaint.'0 7 Chief Judge Wachtler, writing for a unanimous
court, ' 8 stated that "[i]n view of the affirmed factual find-
ings ' ' 0° this court declines taking "the legislative action urged
by plaintiffs in the context of this lawsuit."" 0
B. Case Background
The plaintiffs, before the court of appeals, sought a judg-
ment which would "among other things, declare the zoning or-
dinance of the Town of Brookhaven void in its entirety be-
cause of the Town's failure to exercise its zoning power ... to
enable development of sufficient low-cost shelter.""' They
also wished to obtain an order which would force the Town of
Brookhaven to "take affirmative action to rectify the per-
ceived housing shortage.""' To achieve this the plaintiffs had
"originally contended that the Town ordinance itself con-
tained several exclusionary devises.""' 3 However, on appeal
106. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (9185).
107. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 87-150, slip op. at 6 (Ct.
App. N.Y. June 11, 1987).
108. Opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Simons, Kaye, Hancock and Bel-
lacosa concurred. Judge Alexander concurred in the result only. Judge Titone took no
part in the decision. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. slip op. at 1.
112. Id.
113. Id. slip op. at 2.
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they conceded "that the ordinance 'on its face does not betray
the Town's opposition' to low-income, multi-familty hous-
ing." 1 " Thus, their core contention before the court of appeals
was that "the Town [had] impeded low income housing
through its implementation of the ordinance."' 1 5 The proof
presented by the plaintiffs in support of this contention was
"that a developer wishing to construct any housing other than
a single-family dwelling obtain a special permit."116
C. Court of Appeals Decision
In this case the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that its scope of review was limited by the affirmed factual
findings, 1 7 thus, it did not have to address the issue of
whether the Town of Brookhaven's zoning ordinances met the
standard's established by Berenson.18 The record before the
court substantiated the fact that "numerous developer appli-
cations for multi-family and subsidized housing were ap-
proved despite the special permit procedures." 9 In addition,
the court found that the reason for the inadequate response to
the need for low-cost multi-family housing was not the alleged
chilling effect of the application procedures but the fact that
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
Under the Brookhaven zoning scheme, a developer may apply for permission
to "cluster" developments in single-family residential districts ("the section
281" application) .... Only after public hearing may the Town Board by
resolution grant the developer permission to build multi-family housing at
desities already allowed in the underlying single-family zone. Alternatively, a
developer may apply for rezoning to on of the two multi-family (MF-1 and
MF-2) districts - a process that allows development at densities higher than
those allowed in the single-family zone, but, according to plaintiffs, like the
"section 281" application, exposes approval of project to vehement commu-
nity opposition. The plaintiffs allege that the failure of the Town to "pre-
map. . . inflates the cost of housing because a developer must submit to a
protracted and expensive approval process; and, second, the process usually
ends in failure because the Town zoning board inevitably bows to strong pub-
lic sentiment against low-cost housing projects.
Id. slip op. at 2-3.
117. Id. slip op. at 4.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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developers did not wish to undertake these types of projects
because of the lack of monetary return.'2 0 The court, in sum,
found that the plaintiffs "failed to demostrate that [the] ef-
forts by the Town caused the claimed shortage of shelter."' ' 21
The court distinguished the issues presented in the in-
stant case from those in Berenson and concluded that the ap-
plication of the Berenson doctrine was inappropriate. "In Ber-
enson, plaintiffs challenged only the facial validity of a per se
exclusion of multi-family dwellings from a zoning ordi-
nance. . . . Plaintiffs here [Suffolk Housing Services] chal-
leng[ed] not facial validity, but [the] legitimate implementa-
tion of the ordinance. ' ''22 Though the court did not delve into
a Berenson analysis, it felt compelled to remind the plaintiffs,
and thus the New York legal community at large: first, that
zoning was essentially a legislative task; 23 and, second, that
when reviewing such claims as presented in this case, the
court desired a more particularized claim directed at a specific
parcel of land.' 24
In conclusion, the court stated that "although it affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint, the decision [should not] be
read as revealing hostility to breaking down even unconstitu-
tional zoning barriers that frustrate the deep human yearning
of low-income and minority groups for decent housing they
can afford in decent surroundings. 1 25 The court stressed that
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. "Zoning, we have already recognized, is an essentially legislative task,
and it is therefore anomalous that courts should be required to perform the tasks of a
regional planner." Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id. slip op. at 5.
The desirability of a more particularized claim directed at specific parcel
of land or project or plan for housing is apparent from our cases. Historically,
the law of zoning in this State had been concerned with development of indi-
vidual plats. . . .In more recent years, we have required a regional approach
- the considered balance of development of the individual parcel with im-
plementation of a comprehensive plan, taking into account community
needs. . . counterbalancing the parochial tendencies of local planning boards
to insulate their communities from an influx of "less desirable" residents.
Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. slip op. at 6.
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due to the "abstract character of the case ' 1 26 no other deci-
sion could be rendered except the drastic solution proposed
by plaintiffs of "essentially legislative interference by the judi-
ciary" 12 7 which the New York Court of Appeals felt compelled
to reject.12 8
D. Author's Comments
We see, in this case, a continuation of the tendency in
New York to place a heavy burden of proof on those who chal-
lenge the validity of local zoning. We also see the state's high-
est court suggesting that future exclusionary zoning litigation
be focused more narrowly on specific parcels of land and be
brought by plaintiffs who have a direct interest in what hap-
pens on that land.
This case, decided on June 11, 1987, follows by a few
weeks the First Department Appellate Division's reversal of
the supreme court's adoption of Mount Laurel in Asian
Americans for Equality v. Koch. 29 In essence, the Appellate
Division found no comparison between the facts of Mount
Laurel and those involved in New York City. The court con-
cluded that, as a whole, New York City's zoning provides for a
properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community as
required by Berenson.130
These recent decisions, handed down after the text of this
article was completed, suggest that there is significant resis-
tance in New York to the comprehensive approach taken in
New Jersey. Apparently, in New York, the exclusionary zon-
ing issue will continue to be decided on a case by case basis,
with a heavy emphasis on competent proof, and on particular-
ized claims and remedies. The critical issues, summarized
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, __ A.D.2d -, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939
(1987).
130. Id. at -, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951-952.
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above, remain open for the courts to address as plaintiffs fol-
low the new paths, as well as that blazed by the New Jersey
judiciary.
33
